digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Other Publications

1975

Book Review of Karl Llewellyn and the Realist
Movement, by William Twining
Edward A. Purcell Jr.
New York Law School, edward.purcell@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_other_pubs
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal History Commons
Recommended Citation
19 American Journal of Legal History 240 (1975).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Other Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY

Vol. XIX

William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement. South
Hackensack, New Jersey. Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1973. xiv,
574 pp. $25.00.
When the clamor of partisan debate fades, scholars are presumably in a position to judge historical events more clearly and
completely. Certainly distance is essential for any adequate evaluation of "legal realism," that diffuse, exciting, infuriating, pretentious, perceptive, and incomplete "movement" which was born at
the turn of the century, matured in the twenties, dominated much
of the thirties, and then . . . what? Perhaps even in the seventies

our perspective is not yet quite long enough.
William Twining, an Englishman by birth, set out to examine
the nature of legal realism through a study of its most sophisticated
spokesman, Karl N. Llewellyn. The author had studied under
Llewellyn in the late fifties and, after the latter's death, organized
his private papers and unpublished manuscripts for the University
of Chicago Law School. Utilizing those extensive papers, and drawing on the personal knowledge of Professor Soia Mentschikoff
(Llewellyn's widow and co-worker) and other contemporaries,
Twining presents the fullest and most judicious account of
Llewellyn's career currently available. The book is thoughtful and
critically balanced. Its greatest strengths lie in its suggestions of
the complexities of "realism", in its informative elaboration of
Llewellyn's jurisprudence, and in its careful attempt to probe the
intellectual consequences of a "realist" approach in the life-long
work of one individual.
Not intended as a full-scale biography, the book skips over
large areas of Llewellyn's personal life, his relationships with
friends and colleagues, and often his own motivations. The main
lines of his career are sketched in, however, and flashes of his personality and character do come through. Twining, for example,
discusses Llewellyn's poetic impulses and stylistic peculiarities,
seeing them as parts of an artistic temperament which colored his
legal work. Clearly, the metaphor of artistic creation increasingly
informed his discussions of the Grand Style, and a more personal
biography might well stress the importance of that temperament
even more than Twining does. Proper judging, Llewellyn argued
in 1960, shows "a desire to move in accordance with the material
as well as within it, to carve with the grain like Konenkov, to
reveal the latent rather than to impose new form."' That metaphor, and the sensibility behind it, perhaps goes a long way in
1. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals
(Boston, 1960), p. 222.
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explaining Llewellyn's differences from such fellow realists as
Cook, Oliphant, and Moore. Even in the early thirties, when he was
pushing a behavioral focus most strongly, Llewellyn never made
a total or exclusive commitment to quantification, objectivism, or
scientism. As he moved in the late tlbirties from the problem of how
to predict judicial decisions to the problem of how to make them,
the artistic metaphor increasingly outweighed the scientific one.
While Twining concerns himself only in part with Llewellyn
the individual, he is centrally concerned with Llewellyn the
thinker. The main purpose of the book, the author explains, is to
provide the reader with a general and integrated introduction to
Llewellyn's jurisprudence. He focuses on the major books and
stresses the particular context in which each was written as well
as their relationship to Llewellyn's maturing philosophy of law.
The analyses are lucid and, though generally complimentary,
often critical. His discussion of several unpublished manuscripts,
especially Law in our Society and The Theory of Rules (large
sections of which are included in the appendices), is helpful in
casting light on Llewellyn's later probings. The book provides
a perceptive and comprehensive summary of his jurisprudence,
bringing out the continuity of his thought without obscuring its
unfinished and exploratory nature. Llewellyn's greatest contribution, Twining declares, was his attempt to concretize sociological
jurisprudence-to discuss specifically how legal scholars could
study the law in sociological, empirical terms. "His capacity to
fertilize, to stimulate and to put familiar things in a fresh perspective is perhaps unsurpassed in the common law world" (p. 371).
High praise, indeed, but largely deserved. There is a tenacity in
Llewellyn's work, a determination to grapple with the practice of
legal institutions, a feel for the richness of the particular case, that
give it a continued vitality and freshness. Twining has done a
major service in reemphasizing the broad achievements of a scholar
who is too often remembered for his eccentricities.
While the author's attention to Llewellyn's jurisprudence is
thus valuable and helpful, the resulting doctrinal emphasis seems
at times to stand in the way of a more fruitful historical analysis.
The relationship between Llewellyn's work on the Uniform Commercial Code and his magnum opus, The Common Law Tradition,
for example, is treated primarily in terms of jurisprudential consonance rather than in terms of specific historical connections. The long chapter on The Common Law Tradition (1960)
comes before the chapters on the U.C.C., even though, as Twining
points out, Llewellyn's major contributions to the Code came in
the years from 1937 to 1953. Thus while the author perceptively
explores the important jurisprudential similarities, he sometimes
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ignores the questions of how and why Llewellyn's thought gradually
changed through time as well as the problem of what specific
impact his varied experience in drafting the U.C.C. had on his
subsequent theoretical writings. Again, Twining treats Llewellyn's
involvement in the Sacco-Vanzetti case out of chronological order
in a late catch-all chapter. He is clearly right in seeing the episode
as an illustration of Llewellyn's institutional-professional orientation, but might not the time of its occurrence be of considerable
further (and even jurisprudential) importance? It seems suggestive at the least that the period of Llewellyn's greatest involvement with the Sacco-Vanzetti National League coincided precisely
with the writing of The Bramble Bush. Surely it is more than
plausible that there was some connection either consciously
in his mind or unconsciously in his mood between the institutional
fate of the two ill starred defendants and that much maligned
sentence: 'What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind,
the law itself."2 Though there may be no conclusive documentary
proof available, the exploration of such a possibility might well
illuminate an important part of Llewellyn's early career.
In two long chapters the author addresses himself to the
fascinating and complex problem of the origin and philosophy of
the Uniform Commercial Code, Llewellyn's major contribution
to American legal practice. Twining is not, as he repeatedly acknowledges, a specialist in commercial law. Hence, given the
immense analytical difficulties involved, the strength of the
chapters lies largely in its cautious warnings and tentative
proximations, rather than in any definitive conclusions. The author
discusses the history of the code's origins, of Llewellyn's central
organizational role, and of the institutional procedures involved
in its creation. Additionally, he raises many of the important
problems which surround the Code itself-its class and economic
biases, its relation to consumer protection, and, ultimately, the
political and social significance of such professionally sponsored
"technical" legal reforms. The chapters are informative, and they
provide a thoughtful study of the relationship between legal theory
and changing legal institutions.
Two understandable shortcomings detract from the overall
contribution of the chapters on the U.C.C. First, the author avoids
the painstaking but revealing task of tracing carefully the various
changes in the draft codes, which would have allowed more precise
estimates as to who was influential at which time and on what
issue. Moreover, the problem of Llewellyn's personal influence on
particular sections of the Code is often blurred. "Llewellyn only
2. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study
(Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., 1951), p. 12.
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exceptionally used his key position to push through pet ideas of
his own in the face of opposition" (p. 300), Twining tantalizingly
concludes. Yet he does not elaborate on what those exceptional
instances were or why Llewellyn chose to fight on them. Second,
although the author ably discusses much of the "jurisprudence"
of the Code, he does not fully discuss the question of the historical
significance of that jurisprudence. The U.C.C. clearly represented
at least a partial ratification of a more flexible, pragmatic, and even
"realistic" view of commercial law. To what extent was the generally
weak opposition to the Code due to a broad change in the way
lawyers conceived of the nature of law? Certainly, as Twining
persuasively argues, the economic convenience and conservatism
of the Code were crucial to its acceptance as were the prestige
and openness of its sponsors. And yet the question remains: how
significant was the change that occurred in the intellectual environment during the preceding fifty years? Samuel Williston, the great
contract specialist of a previous generation, opposed much of the
Code, and, as Twining points out, in 1950 Williston was almost
wholly ignored. The innovations of the U.C.C. have been frequently
discussed, though usually in an abstract and piecemeal fashion.
A comprehensive study of the intellectual origins of the U.C.C.,
which admittedly lies beyond the purpose of this book, would
illuminate more precisely the extent and character of the influence
that Llewellyn and realism had on American legal thought and
practice.
This, of course, brings up the broader question of the nature
and significance of the whole phenomenon known as legal realism.
Here again Twining's careful judgments clarify aspects of the
movement. He emphasizes the institutional origins of Realism,
"dominated to a large extent by some more immediate, specialized
concerns of academic lawyers about how they should approach
their tasks of teaching and scholarly research" (p. 9). Since the
narrower professional and pedagogical roots of the movement
have often been slighted, Twining is on solid ground in emphasizing the immediate academic context, and especially in
analyzing the internal developments within the Yale and Columbia
law schools which helped nourish "realistic" attitudes. His discussion of Pound, Cook, Corbin, and Hohfeld delineates their
roles as transitional figures, and his chapter on the attempts at
curriculum revision at Columbia in the twenties clarifies the
institutional context as well as the theoretical conflicts that engaged
many of the innovators. Emphasizing the difficulty of accurately
generalizing about such a movement, Twining carefully points
out the differences that separated those who have been lumped
together as realists. He praises Llewellyn's "sensitivity to the
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nuances of the particular" (p. 387), and he himself exhibits a
similar sensitivity. The wisdom of such an approach for the study
of a phenomenon as vague as "legal realism" is apparent, and
there is much merit in his suggestion that scholars should now
attempt to more carefully chart the nature of the movement
through a number of individual intellectual biographies.
Even though Twining warns that he is not attempting a complete study of legal realism, his approach does raise certain
caveats. While his emphasis on the institutional context of the
twenties is important, for example, he tends to push it too far.
"After 1928," Twining declares, "the realist movement lost such
coherence as it ever had" (p. 67). Such a thesis tends to reflect the
author's particular reference point-coherent academic debate
within two major law schools-rather than the full scope of the
intellectual and social movement, vital though amorphous, which
was developing even before 1928. It is ultimately a definition of
legal realism that Twining presents, one that is organizationally
convenient but historically constricting. By identifying realism
with the efforts toward curriculum reform at Columbia and Yale,
the author simplifies the problem of analysis and in part creates
for himself the relative "coherence" that he sees before 1928. His
focus obscures the equally important truth that realism was also
an integral part of two broader movements which go back at
least to the turn of the century: intellectually, the cross-discipline
movement toward pragmatism, behaviorism, and quantification;
and socially, the spread of academic institutionalism, educational
professionalism, and "scientific" reformism. Twining is undoubtedly
right that in some sense 1928 marks a break, but from a broader
perspective it is the sociological and intellectual continuity, not
the internal institutional change, that seems more significant.
By viewing realism after 1928 as "two fragmented" to sustain
meaningful generalizations (p. 377), Twining provides a justification for turning his attention solely to Llewellyn and largely
ignoring many of the other manifestations of realism. As a reasonable device to make his study manageable, this is of course wholly
legitimate and unexceptional. Llewellyn alone is well worth a book
of such length. As an historical interpretation, however, the thesis
that realism became "too fragmented" to warrant generalized
analysis ignores one of the most important problems in twentieth
century American law: how have the changing conceptions of the
nature of law and of the judicial process associated with "realism"
affected working legal institutions. To Twining's great credit, he
is well aware of that problem and in fact devotes parts of his book
to its analysis. By the general thrust of his own argument, the
date 1928 is only a minor significance.
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The author's occasional inattention to broader historical
events also helps explain why he regards it as "puzzling" that
realism proved to be so controversial (p. 382). He acknowledges
the extreme statements made by some realists, but suggests that
they were often outweighed by the sound and thoughtful contributions of many others. Realism, however, did not provoke bitter
debate simply because too many people overestimated the first
and ignored the second. Rather the controversy erupted because
a large number of people saw realism as the legal manifestation of
a much broader intellectual and professional movement, namely
the rise of excessive empiricism, deterministic naturalism, and
ethical relativism. Regardless of the accuracy of those judgmentloaded terms, realism did arise intellectually out of the naturalism
and pragmatism of the early twentieth century and hence readily
fit in to a much broader philosophical debate that was already
engulfing American academic life. Realism was labelled and
realists identified at the beginning of the thirties, the precise time
that economic depression, political experimentalism, and the
horror of Nazism all combined to confront thoughtful Americans
with a profound intellectual, political, and emotional challenge.
Many of the realists were convinced that they represented
the forces of enlightment, science, and reform, and hence many
of them saw their critics as obscurantists and medievalists. Their
opponents-legal traditionalists, Catholics, and political conservatives among others-viewed realism as part of a broad movement
that encouraged mindless fact-gathering and ethical nihilism.
Realism, from the time of its formal christening, existed in a tense,
anxious, and emotionally charged context that made calm reflection
difficult. Given that historical background, there is no puzzle as
to why realism proved as controversial as it did.
The emotional character of that debate helped to confuse many
issues and to present a distorted picture of a number of thinkers.
Llewellyn, especially, was often attacked unfairly. While there are
passages in some of his earlier works that made him vulnerable,
the overall approach he was suggesting--even in the early thirties-was largely sound, reasonably cautious, and generally suggestive rather than strident. Llewellyn seldom if ever made the
kind of extreme and mocking charges that one associates with Cook,
Frank, or Arnold. He was more tentative, more catholic, and, ultimately, more perceptive. Llewellyn was ethically a relativist and
methodologically a pragmatist, both of which put him fairly on
one side of the debates of the thirties. Still, however, his thoughtful and useful work merited a more generous treatment than it
often received. Llewellyn was, more than were many of the other
realists, an undeserving victim of the anti-realist reaction.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY

Vol.

XIX

Professor Twining's work is a thoughtful and valuable contribution to the literature on American legal thought. It draws
on a great deal of research, states issues fairly and cautiously,
and suggests useful lines of inquiry for future work. "Perhaps the
most important lesson to be learned from a study of realism,"
Twining concludes, "is a partial answer to the question: What
difference can it make in practice to adopt a sociological (or
realist or contextual) approach to law?" (p. 383). While one might
doubt the equation sociological-realist-contextual, the broad question is clearly crucial, and Twining takes a significant step toward
answering it. If scholars respond, perhaps someday we will have
a deeper understanding of just what it really was that realism
helped do to American legal theory and practice.
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., Associate Professor,
Departmentof History, University of Missouri, Columbia

Michael Landon, The Triumph of the Lawyers: Their Role in
English Politics, 1678-1689. University, Alabama, University
of Alabama Press, 1970. 303 pp. $7.50.
In these days of the Bicentennial, it is useful to ponder anew
not merely the causative factual origins of the American Revolution, but the intellectual seedbed in which those events germinated.' Every generation, applying the past's lessons toward
solution of present problems, tends to approach its task in a kind
of walking deja vu. Seeing dark clouds one morning, and remembering that the last time we saw them a blizzard followed, we don
our ski jackets. But unfortunately, sometimes we forget that
because this is July we will not have snow, but rain, in which a
quilted coat will be more hindrance than protection. Those who
ignore history are compelled merely to relive it; those who misapply history relive it with agony. The most recent such misapplication was Vietnam.
The Revolutionary generation took its constitutional frame
of reference principally from two sources: the history of England
in the 17th century, particularly the period 1640-1689; and the
geography of the North Atlantic and the American Eastern seaboard. The latter, to which these brief comments must perforce
devote scant attention, emphasized both the colonies' physical
isolation and (through the glacial quality of communications) the
1. B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
(1967) is the exemplar.

